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Sentiments in the Housing Market and the Effectiveness of Government Interventions 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the factors that drive the recent growth of house prices in Malaysia. By constructing 
a housing market sentiment index, we find contemporaneous sentiment to have a strong influence on future 
housing market returns especially in the short-term. Government-introduced cooling measures were 
ineffective in dampening prices and market sentiment. We also find property developer behaviour to drive 
sentiments and prices. The study contributes to literature by providing an easily generalizable method of 
constructing a housing market sentiment index in other countries besides giving clear indication of the 
drivers of house prices and sentiment for more effective government intervention. 
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Sentiments in the Housing Market and the Effectiveness of Government Interventions 
 
1.0 Introduction 
Commonly defined as the propensity of investors to behave in a manner that is not justified by the 
exogenous information at hand, investor sentiments have been shown to have significant influence over 
asset prices (Baker & Wurgler, 2006; 2007). The effects are no different in the housing market (Clayton, 
Ling, and Naranjo, 2009; Hui, Zheng, and Wang, 2013). In fact, the effects of investor sentiments in the 
housing market are stronger due to the market’s illiquid nature and a lack of short-selling mechanisms 
thereby restricting the market’s ability to correct mispricings (Clayton et al, 2009b). This creates a vacuum 
of information especially within the private housing market causing investors to be more susceptible to 
sentiments. 
The past decade has seen persistent house price growth in Malaysia, reigniting fears of the Asian Financial 
Crisis of 1997 which saw markets tumbling after the bubble burst. In hopes of slowing the growth in prices, 
the Malaysian government and the central bank – Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) – had to introduce a range 
of monetary, fiscal, and legislative measures. Market participants, however, opine that these measures have 
only succeeded in reducing the number of transactions taking place, and not the price of the house itself 
(Yeong, 2014). BNM itself has indicated that the growth in house prices are not in line with long-term 
averages as well as economic fundamentals, attributing the growth to market sentiment and speculation 
(Hisyam, 2013). In fact, Cheong et al. (2019) established preliminary evidence that house prices in Malaysia 
were largely driven by supply-side market sentiments. That is to say, the property developers played an 
influential role in (artificially) driving prices up. This study builds upon the findings of Cheong et al. (2019) 
by investigating the effectiveness of the measures introduced by the government and central bank from the 
years 2010 to 2019, using an updated dataset.  
This study is focused on the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia because firstly, many economic policies 
have been focused on this part of the country leading to a disparity in development, pricing, and inflation 
between Malaysia’s 14 states. Various commentators have cited speculation and sentiment as the reason 
behind this difference providing us with an ideal setting to test for market sentiments. Second, government 
measures such as the affordable housing project has also been targeted at key urban centres in the country, 
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many of which lie on the West Coast. This again, provides a suitable backdrop to assess their effectiveness 
in addressing rising house prices and market sentiments.  
The study begins in similar fashion to Cheong et al., (2019), Zhou (2017), and Baker and Wurgler (2006) 
with constructing the housing market sentiment index through the selection of proxies that best represents 
conditions in the Malaysian housing market. This is followed by a principal component analysis on the 
selected sentiment proxies to determine the proxies which had the strongest impact on sentiments before 
regressing each of them against economic fundamentals variables to negate the effects of business and 
economic cycle variations. This is followed by a partial least squares (PLS) regression to derive a housing 
market sentiment index. The trends observed in Cheong et al. (2019) persist in this study. Specifically, we 
find our sentiment index continues to be strongly correlated with Malaysia’s consumer and business 
confidence index, more so the latter than the former. We also found periods of high sentiment to be 
followed by higher returns, contrary to a few prior studies (Stambaugh, Yu & Yuan, 2012; Berger & Turtle, 
2015; Zhou, 2017) 
We then proceed to investigate the effectiveness of government cooling measures in slowing house prices 
and sentiments. We find most of the measures introduced are not effective in dampening house prices and 
sentiments in the market. For those measures that were effective in lowering sentiments, we find the effects 
to only last for a maximum of 3 months after which sentiments rebound. Robustness tests reveal that our 
results are consistent across all states that were in the dataset graciously provided by National Property 
Information Centre (NAPIC). We also find the magnitude of effect sentiment has on housing market 
returns, as well as the effectiveness of cooling measures to differ across states; consistent with our 
conjecture that concentration of economic activity and development in certain states influences their 
sensitivity to sentiments and the effectiveness of the cooling measures. Further tests also show that our 
results remain consistent when we decompose the data into daily instead of monthly observations. 
Several contributions arise from this study. First, our approach in measuring housing market sentiments by 
way of proxies complements that of Soo (2013) who used a textual analysis approach and Hui and Wang 
(2014). Our approach also complements Zhou (2017) in that we show how the proxy selection process can 
be adapted in ways that best reflect local market conditions and data availability. The ease of its construction 
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provides a simple guide for the government and other parties interested in monitoring housing market 
conditions to replicate. Second, our results empirically confirm the opinions of various market 
commentators on the ineffectiveness of the cooling measures introduced by the government and BNM 
(Yeong 2013, 2014). Market sentiments drive house prices and inhibit the effectiveness of these measures. 
Specifically, our results suggest that sentiments are strongly driven by developer activity among others. 
Further interventions in the housing market should ideally address this. 
The rest of this paper is as follows. Section 2 provides a brief history on the Malaysian housing market and 
a review of literature on sentiments in the housing market. In Section 3 we detail the process of constructing 
the sentiment index. In Section 4 we show the results to our tests. Section 5 provides a discussion of results 
and implications before concluding. 
2.0 Literature Review 
 2.1 A Brief History of the Malaysian Housing Market 
From 2001 to 2010, the long-term average annual growth of house prices in Malaysia was approximately 
3.2 percent, in line with the national level of income and economic development (BNM, 2010). This figure 
tripled to about 9.41 percent between Q1 2010 and Q3 2014, largely due to the sudden growth in the three 
largest urban regions of Malaysia – the Klang Valley, Penang, and Johor – where house prices grew at a rate 
of 11.38, 10.60, and 10.36 percent per year respectively. Fears of a property market crash in 2018 and 
beyond persisted after the Deputy Finance Minister revealed that the number of unsold residential units 
rose by 40 percent (Kaur, 2017). Representatives of developer associations however, rubbished these fears, 
arguing that market optimism, demand, and buyer expectations will readjust accordingly (Augustin, 2017).  
2.2 Government Interventions in the Housing Market 
Malaysia housing market history is peppered with various policies and interventions. We summarize a few 
of the key interventions and policies that were introduced during our 2010 to 2019 sample period. 
BNM introduced a 70 percent limit to the loan-to-value (LTV) on personal third and subsequent mortgages 
(BNM, 2013; Kamalvacini, 2014) in hopes of discouraging speculators from taking advantage of easy credit. 
BNM also raised the capital risk-weights on first and second mortgages to 100 percent, besides requiring 
LTVs to be calculated based on the net selling price of the property. With effect from 2012, BNM also 
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required debt service ratios to calculated based on the borrower’s net (i.e. after statutory deductions such 
as income taxes, Employee Provident Fund and Social Security contributions) rather gross income (BNM, 
2011). 
To curb speculative activity, the Malaysian government re-introduced the Real Property Gains Tax (RPGT) 
in 2010 after a 3-year suspension and has gradually raised the rates over the years. As of writing, the RPGT 
rates are at 30 percent for houses sold after 1 to 3 years of ownership; 20 percent after 4 years of ownership, 
15 percent after 5 years of ownership, and 5 percent thereafter. The RPGT was re-introduced in hopes of 
discouraging speculators from ‘flipping’ – buying a property (often new) without intention of occupying, 
and then selling it off in a short period of time to (hopefully) earn substantial capital gains. 
Besides curbing property speculation, the government also sought to address public concern over housing 
affordability by establishing Perbadanan PR1MA Malaysia under the PR1MA Act 2012 – a government-
owned developer tasked to construct housing projects that are affordable to the middle-income group. 
These housing projects are located in key urban centres around the country, and are built to compete with 
the design and build quality of private market developers in the country. Open to only Malaysian citizens, 
the PR1MA projects are meant to curb speculative activity in the housing market by firstly cutting out the 
middlemen, and secondly, imposing various restrictions on eligibility of applicants. 
Finally, the government in October 2013 abolished the Developer Interest Bearing Scheme (DIBS). 
Originally intended to make home-ownership easier by allowing developers to bear the interest cost for 
buyers during the construction phase, many developers abused the DIBS by making inaccurate claims of 
additional discounts and rebates when in fact, the cost of these benefits were imputed into the price of the 
property, thereby inflating its price (Chang, 2014) by an additional 20 to 25 percent (The Star Online, 2013), 
Speculators with the help of investor clubs – loose alliances of high net worth individuals – meanwhile, 
exploited DIBS by pooling financial resources and buying properties in bulk from developers at a discount 
prior to the official launch (Mok, 2015). Their speculative purchase distorted actual demand and prices, 
artificially raising asking prices in the secondary markets (Yeong, 2013).  
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Various quarters however argue that despite these measures, transacted prices remain high even though 
there was a fall in the number of transactions (Yeong, 2014). This puts into question the effectiveness of 
these measures, and what (if any) can be done to curb the rise in prices. 
2.3 Sentiments and Government Intervention in the Housing Market 
Traditionally, the decision-making process behind a property purchase was assumed to be rational, through 
the use of facts and data that led to an optimal decision. Asymmetric or even deficient information however 
causes buyers to turn to other sources to justify their decisions and pricing. Gallimore and Gray (2002) 
found the most common source to be market sentiments. Relying on market sentiments for price 
information is however, problematic especially in the housing market for a few reasons. Firstly, the large 
number of individual buyers – all of whom have a unique set of criteria in asset selection and pricing – 
makes any standard of comparison unequal. Second, the housing market is a market for lemons. The stock 
market has built-in disclosure and price-discovery mechanisms that help reduce information asymmetry by 
way of a transparent price market that is updated by the minute, and other regulatory disclosure 
requirements mandated by the Securities Commission. Property developers, sellers or real estate agents in 
contrast, are not bound by the same mechanisms and therefore have an incentive to withhold information 
if it is to their advantage pricewise. Also, without a short-sale mechanism, overvalued assets will remain 
overvalued until the market corrects itself. It is for these reasons that the housing market is highly vulnerable 
to sentiment-induced mispricing (Clayton et al., 2009a; Hui & Wang, 2014).  
According to the Department of Statistics, Malaysia, as of 2017, total fixed assets in the construction sector 
was valued at RM27.9 billion. The top 4 construction and property development companies (by market 
capitalization as of 18 April 2021) already accounts for more than 50% of this total fixed assets value making 
the housing market in Malaysia dominated by a handful of large property developers. As a result, a slight 
shift in optimism on their part would have a huge effect on house prices in the country (Piazessi and 
Schneider, 2009) even under perfect market conditions (Clayton, 1997; Clayton et al., 2009a). Jin et al. 
(2014) similarly found irrational consumer sentiment to be a significant exogenous variable in the pricing 
of U.S. residential real estate. In fact, the susceptibility of the housing market to sentiments – positive in 
particular – is so strong that so long as there is uncertainty over the economic outlook of the country, and 
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optimistic agents continue to hold firmer views than others do, the housing boom will continue (Burnside, 
Eichenbaum, & Rebelo, 2015).  
Government intervention in the housing market is nothing new. Whether these interventions are designed 
to spur the housing market or otherwise does not matter. What matters is whether they are effective at 
addressing the problem. For example, in an effort to encourage homeownership, the U.S. government 
provided favourable tax treatment of owner-occupied housing. This however, created an incentive to ‘over-
consume’ housing (Cho & Francis, 2011). Chambers, Garriga, and Schlagenhauf (2009) similarly found 
government interventions to be a double-edged sword. Inherent differences in tax treatments between 
owned and rented housing could be amplified or mitigated through progressivity of income taxation, with 
further ramifications on various other aspects of the housing market. A more recent study by Floetotto, 
Kirker, and Stroebel (2016) also showed that tax incentives encourage homeownership and temporarily 
raise house prices but adversely affects welfare. Berry, McGreal, Stevenson, & Young (2001) likewise found 
that government interventions places pressure on owner-occupiers due to investor speculation and are only 
effective in the short-run as market forces quickly negate them. 
The persistent rise in house prices in Malaysia in spite of the measures introduced by the government and 
central bank provides an ideal setting for us to conduct this study. Due to inherent structural and policy 
differences between the housing markets of Malaysia and those seen in prior studies, further investigation 




 3.1 Data 
Our data is from the secondary housing market on the West Coast of Peninsular Malaysia. Collectively, the 
West Coast contributes to approximately 70 percent of the national GDP. The data provided by the 
National Property Information Centre (NAPIC) included the details of 298,038 secondary housing market 
transactions along the West Coast, over a 10-year sample period from January 2010 to December 2019. We 
however, chose to focus on four key states namely Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, and Penang. These four 
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states alone contribute approximately 50 percent to the national GDP and has been a hotbed of real estate 
transactions throughout the sample period. The secondary market transactions in these four states alone 
account for approximately 70 percent of the total transactions that occurred on the West Coast. The 
variables in our data include the district, house address, type, number of floors, lot size, valuation date, 
transacted price, and the identities of the buyer(s) and seller(s).  
 3.2 Housing Market Sentiment Index Proxies 
The literature on constructing sentiment indices is typically split into two camps: direct measures, and 
indirect measures. The direct approach constitutes measures where respondents (i.e. real estate investors, 
appraisers, and lenders) are surveyed on a variety of issues such as rates of return on equity, rental growth 
rates, and their expectations of future real estate market conditions (Ling et al., 2014). Some countries (e.g. 
the United States) maintain a detailed record of such surveys through dedicated institutions such as the Real 
Estate Research Corporation (RERC). Malaysia, unfortunately, does not hold such information on the 
public record. As such, for the purpose of this study, we had to adopt the indirect approach of constructing 
a sentiment index. The indirect approach to sentiment index construction was made popular by Baker and 
Wurgler (2006). While seemingly complex, the construction of a sentiment index is an intuitive process. 
Instead of using a single indicator (e.g. momentum, turnover) as a measure of sentiment, we introduce 
sentiment proxies that are directly relevant to the housing market in Malaysia by adopting the process of 
generating proxies provided by Baker and Wurgler (2006). So far, we identified only three other studies that 
adopted this approach (see Hui & Wang, 2014; Ling, et al., 2014; and Zhou, 2017).  
Ling et al.’s (2014) indirect sentiment index, constructed using real estate investment trust (REIT) data, is 
arguably comprehensive. There are however, two issues that prevents us from following in their footsteps. 
First is the availability of data. The proxies used in their construction (e.g. REIT stock price to net asset 
value; net capital flows to REIT mutual funds) are easily available for a well-established financial market 
such as the US. The same data however, could not be found for Malaysian REITs from publicly available 
sources. Second, the Malaysian REITs market is small with only 17 REITs listed (as of 18 April 2021), with 
a combined market capitalization of MYR20.2 billion, representing a materially insignificant 1 percent of 
Bursa Malaysia’s Main Market. Furthermore, the distribution of REITs in Malaysia is highly skewed and 
concentrated. One REIT has a market capitalization of MYR12.5 billion; another has a market capitalization 
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of approximately MYR2 billion, while two have a market capitalization of approximately MYR1 billion. 
The remaining 13 REITs have a market capitalization that is well below MYR500 million with half of them 
worth less than MYR10 million. The smallest was worth about MYR1.3 million. With this distribution and 
sample size, any attempt to remove outliers would result in a sample that is so small as to render it unreliable. 
Given these considerations, we instead adopt Zhou’s (2017) approach of using property market transaction 
data. We discuss the intuition behind each of our sentiment proxies below. 
Malaysia adopts a sale-before-construction system. The system provides a substantial investment incentive 
to property developers to demand and purchase more land-space as they are able to lock in the profits of 
the project even before construction begins. As demand for land-space and buy-side investment incentives 
are major determinants of new housing projects (Tse, Ho, & Ganesan, 1999), it is reasonable to assume 
that developers are driving and simultaneously sensitive to market sentiments. In Baker and Wurgler (2006), 
the number of IPOs was a sentiment proxy for the stock market. The greater the number of IPOs, the 
more optimistic the sentiment. Similarly, we argue that the incoming and completed supply of residential 
units scaled by the existing stock of residential units in the past quarter reflects sentiments in the housing 
market. We call this proxy NewStock and expect it to be positively correlated with housing market 
sentiments. 
Due to various legal and financial restrictions and requirements, even if they can afford to pay for it in cash, 
most house buyers in Malaysia prefer to finance the purchase with a mortgage. Some may argue that the 
distinction between investors and house-consumers (Genesove & Mayer, 2001) may influence the terms 
and conditions of payment. However, the house-buying process in Malaysia is the same for everyone 
regardless of intention. As the NewStock proxy represents the position of developers, we contend that total 
residential mortgage divided by total loans in the country represents the position of buyers1. We call this 
proxy ResMort and expect it to be positively correlated with housing market sentiments. 
Having accounted for the supply and demand drivers in the housing market, we now consider the matter 
of liquidity. Liquidity has often been regarded as an indicator of sentiment (Baker and Stein, 2004; Clayton 
et al., 2008). Rising liquidity in the housing market is a channel through which a pricing-sentiment spiral in 
the housing market is amplified (Ling, Ooi, & Le, 2011). Typically, liquidity is measured through turnover. 
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In the housing market, this may be reflected in the length of time the buyer owns the property. In keeping 
with the literature, we include the natural log of the median holding period of sellers (in months) as a proxy 
for turnover. We can determine the holding period by identifying the date when the property was bought 
and sold. Since we are able to identify the buyer(s) and seller(s) for each transaction, we also use the number 
of sub-sales2 in a month as a proxy for turnover. While it can be argued that sub-sales are affected by the 
real property gains tax, they also account for instances where the housing project took longer than 4 years 
to complete3. We call these proxies HoldPer and SubSale respectively. We expect HoldPer to be negatively 
correlated while expecting SubSale to be positively correlated with housing market sentiments. 
The final aspect of sentiment we consider here is buyer confidence. The corporate finance literature 
suggests that overconfident managers are more likely to overinvest or pay a premium on acquisitions when 
there are surplus funds available (Malmeinder & Tate, 2005; 2008). Similarly, a buyer’s confidence in the 
housing market and future property values will have a strong part to play in the price paid for the house. 
The greater their confidence in future house prices, the more they will be willing to pay for the house now. 
We feel that simply taking the size of the house (in square meters) transacted would not accurately reflect 
buyer’s confidence in Malaysia as there are many large houses that are cheap and vice versa. Instead, we use 
the transacted price per square meter (in MYR) as a measure of buyer confidence. It is also not uncommon 
for sellers to factor various improvements or additions (e.g. renovations, fixtures and fittings, accessibility, 
security) into their asking prices. The monetary value of these additions however, are subjective and cannot 
be captured by the price per square meter measure. As an alternative, we also use the number of transactions 
that are RM1 million4 and above in a month as a proxy for buyer confidence. We call these proxies PSQM 
and P1M respectively. We expect both proxies to be positively correlated with housing market sentiments. 
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
Table 1 provides the annual averages of the six proposed proxies of housing market sentiments from 2010 
to 2019. Except for PSQM and P1M, all other proxies recorded the highest annual average in 2011. The 
annual averages fell in 2012, presumably after the launch of the PR1MA projects at end-2011, before rising 
again in 2014 – the same year the DIBS was abolished. The numbers slowed in 2015 before climbing in 
2016 and has not stopped since. These numbers seem to suggest that the NewStock, ResMort, HoldPer, and 
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SubSale metrics are correlated with economic fundamentals and affected by cooling measures. However, 
throughout the 10-year sample period, both PSQM and P1M rose regardless, suggesting a persistently high 
level of confidence in future house prices. 
3.3 Constructing the Sentiment Index 
The first step is to negate the effects of business cycle variations and macro-factors from the proxies using 
an orthogonalization process by regressing each of the standardized sentiment proxies on eight economic 
fundamental variables (Ling et al., 2014). These variables are the Purchasing Manager’s Index (PMI), the 
Industrial Production Index (IPI), the profit margin of the real estate industry in the last calendar year 
(REP), the growth of the Consumer Price Index (CPI), and the growth of M2 (M2). Total loans to the 
property sector divided by total loans in the country (TLP) are included to represent developers’ access to 
credit (Cheong et al., 2020). Risks of loan defaults are accounted for through total non-performing loans to 
the real estate market divided by the total loans in the country (NPL). Finally, BLR+ defined as the average 
premium (discount) charged by banks in the country above (below) the base lending rate is included to 
account for interest rate effects on property loans. The residuals from these regressions should thus contain 
a measure of housing market sentiment that is orthogonal to business cycle and macro factors. This is 
followed by a three-month smoothing of the residuals (Huang, Jiang, Tu, and Zhou, 2014). 
The next step is a principal component analysis for all sentiment proxies5. The daily data for each proxy is 
aggregated monthly throughout the 10-year sample period (2010 – 2019; n = 120). The same is repeated 
for the one-month lagged values to account for the possibility that one proxy may have an impact on 
another in the future (Baker & Wurgler, 2006). We then compute the correlation between the first principal 
component (P1) and each of the current and lagged proxies. Whichever proxy has the highest statistically 
significant correlation magnitude is chosen as a proxy for our housing market sentiment. These values are 
presented in Table 2. 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
The principal component analysis suggests the selection of the current value of NewStock, ResMort, HoldPer, 
SubSale, and the lagged value of PSQM as our housing market sentiment proxies6. 
 Pxi,t – 1 = βi,0,t  + βi,1,t Rt + βi,2,t Rt – 1 + ei, t – 1        (1) 
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 Pxi,t = αt + St 𝛽𝑖,1,?̂?  + vi,t         (2) 
The final step is to estimate a partial least squares regression (1) to construct a look-ahead-bias-free 
sentiment index (Huang et al., 2014). Equation 1 is estimated for each of the chosen proxies, Pxi, where Rt 
is the housing market return at time t. The series βi,1,t captures the time-varying sensitivity of Pxi to the 
market sentiment instrumented by future housing market returns7. Including Rt – 1 on the right side of 
Equation 1 is intuitive in the Malaysian market since transacted prices are also driven by previous transacted 
prices in the same locale. It also controls for short-term reversals (Zhou, 2017). Equation 2 is a cross-
sectional regression where the independent variable is the loadings estimated from Equation 1. The time 
series of the slope S represents the sentiment index. 
 
4.0 Results & Discussion 
 4.1 A Simple Illustration 
Figure 1 illustrates the quarterly cumulative change of our constructed housing market sentiment index, 
Malaysia’s house price index, consumer confidence index, and business confidence index from 2010 to 
2019. The sentiment index values have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels and then averaged 
quarterly before calculating and then cumulating the quarterly changes over time. The computed sentiment 
index from January 2010 to December 2019 has a mean of 0.501 and a median of 0.548. The index had a 
maximum value of 0.990, a minimum value of 0.028, and a standard deviation of 0.299. Superimposing our 
index against the cumulative change in the house price index provides some preliminary evidence of our 
index’s ability to predict house price movement. The correlation coefficient between the sentiment index 
and house price index is 0.8792, statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. Arguably, house prices 
in Malaysia have been on the cumulative rise despite the various cooling measures introduced since 2010. 
Figure 1 also suggests that the cooling measures have not been able to curb housing market sentiments. 
For example, when the PR1MA project launched in Q4 2011, sentiments fell slightly before climbing up 
again within a few months. Similarly, when the DIBS was abolished in Q4 2013, sentiments fell before 
climbing up again in the next quarter.  
To establish its reliability, we also plot the sentiment index against cumulative change in the consumer 
confidence and business confidence indices. These indices should suffice for Malaysia since the housing 
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market not only attracts consumers and investors (Han, 2013; Miller & Pandher, 2008) but businesses (i.e. 
property developers) as well. The consumer confidence index would represent consumer and investor 
outlook while the business confidence index represents developer outlook. All three indices (sentiment, 
consumer confidence, business confidence) seem to move in a general upward trend, with their dips and 
rises seemingly coinciding with the time frame when cooling measures were introduced. The correlation 
coefficient between our sentiment index and the consumer confidence index is 0.7815 while against the 
business confidence index, it is 0.8537. Both are statistically significant at the 1% level of confidence. What 
this seems to suggest is housing market sentiments in Malaysia are more strongly correlated with developer 
instead of consumer and investor activity. 
4.2 The Impact of Sentiments on Housing Market Returns  
Before assessing the effectiveness of government policies in controlling rising house prices, we must first 
establish the housing market sentiment index’s ability to predict future housing market returns. To do so, 
we estimate the following regression: 
R[t + 1, t + b] = α + β1St + β2Festivalt + β3Holidayt + β4Rt + β5M2t + β6BLRt + εt   (3); 
where R[t + 1, t + b] is the cumulative housing market return using the Malaysia house price index from month 
t + 1 to month t + b where b = 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12; and S is the value of our sentiment index at month t. We 
account for seasonal effects (Kaplanski & Levy, 2012) in Malaysia’s housing market by including the 
variables Festivalt which is a binary variable that is ‘1’ if month t or its immediately preceding month has a 
major festival8; and Holidayt which is a binary variable that is ‘1’ if month t coincides with the school 
holidays9. The festival and holiday season in Malaysia typically witness a growth in home-related 
transactions including but not limited to house purchase, moving homes, renovations and modifications to 
the home. It is also during these periods where developers typically offer various promotions and discounts 
on their housing projects10. We control for current month returns (Rt) to account for current transacted 
price trends and short-term reversals. We include the growth of M2 (M2t) to control for effects arising from 
changing monetary policies over time. We also control for the influence the base lending rate (BLRt) has 
on consumer and investor propensity to take up a mortgage. Equation 3 estimates are in Table 3 below11. 
INSERT TABLE 3 HERE 
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From Table 3 we can see that S has a positive coefficient across all models. However, the statistical 
significance of the relationship weakens when we attempt to predict returns farther into the future (i.e. 
Models (5) – (7)). We can also see that the seasonal effects have no impact on housing market returns in 
Malaysia. Changes to monetary policy, likewise, has no statistically significant effect on housing market 
returns. The base lending rate in contrast reduces housing market returns; an effect that is well within 
expectations since the interest expense on mortgage repayments lowers the returns sellers earn. 
In keeping with the literature on market sentiments, Models (3) – (7) in Table 3 are re-estimated but instead 
of using a single measure of sentiment (St), we consider the impact of optimistic and pessimistic sentiments 
on housing market returns. Here the sentiment index is split into two: S+ and S- where S+ equals S when 
S has a positive value while S- equals S when S is negative. Both S+ and S- are zero otherwise. The regression 
estimates are in Table 4. 
INSERT TABLE 4 HERE 
The results in Table 4 are consistent with those in Table 3; positive sentiments drive housing market returns. 
Although not statistically significant, we also see that negative sentiments drive housing market returns 
down. The coefficient signs and statistical significance of all other variables are the same as those in Table 
3. 
Note that R has the same coefficient sign as S (Table 3) and S+ (Table 4). The statistical significance of S 
/ S+ may be spurious if there is a positive correlation between R and S / S+. To address this possibility, 
Equation 3 is re-estimated without S before regressing the residuals on S, and S+ and S-. The statistically 
significant positive relationship between S and S+ on housing market returns persist as what we saw in 
Table 3 and 412. Thus, it is safe to assume that the predictive power of S / S+ was not the result of its 







4.3 Government Interventions 
Evidence presented earlier shows that housing market sentiments drive house prices in Malaysia. Now, we 
need to determine the effectiveness of the government interventions and BNM measures in curbing 
speculation and cooling the housing market. The interventions and measures examined in this study are: 
(1) the real property gains tax; (2) abolishing the Developer Interest Bearing Scheme; (3) new PR1MA 
project launches; (4) the assessment of borrowers on their net instead of gross income; and (5) a stricter 
loan-to-value ratio policy. Real property gains tax (RPGT) is defined as the average tax payable for all 
transactions occurring in month t. The tax payable is calculated by applying the appropriate RPGT rate 
(based on the duration of the seller’s ownership) on the transacted price, and then averaged across all 
transactions that occurred during month t. The abolishment of the Developer Interest Bearing Scheme 
(DIBS) is a binary variable that is ‘1’ if month t occurs after the scheme was abolished. The new PR1MA 
project launch (PR1MA) is a binary variable that is ‘1’ if there was a new PR1MA project launched in month 
t. The change from gross to net income (NI) is a binary variable that is ‘1’ if one-third of the median net 
monthly household income for postcode i13 is lower than the monthly repayment of the median transacted 
house price for postcode i in month t14. The stricter loan-to-value (LTV) policy is defined as the average 
down-payment required for each transaction in postcode i in month t. To illustrate, a 90 percent LTV would 
require a 10 percent down-payment on the transacted price. We then average this 10 percent across 
postcodes and then for the month. Three levels of LTV are considered: 70, 80, and 90 percent. To do so, 
we estimate the following regression: 
R[t + 1, t + b] = α + β1St + β2RPGTt + β3 St ×RPGTt + β4DIBSt + β5 St ×DIBSt + β6PR1MAt   
  + β7 St ×PR1MAt + β8 NIi,t + β9 St ×NIi,t + β10 LTVt + β11 St ×LTVt    
  + β12Festivalt + β13Holidayt + β14Rt + β15M2t + β16BLRt + εt     (4). 
 
We only use b = 1 and b = 3 for the dependent variable as the earlier results show a weak relationship from 
b = 6 and onwards. Equation 4 is estimated three times, each time using a different level of LTV. Following 
these specifications, if the interventions and measures were effective, the coefficient signs of the interaction 
term with S should be negative. The results are in Table 5 below. 
INSERT TABLE 5 HERE 
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From Table 5, we can see that apart from S × PR1MA and S × LTV, all other measures seem to be 
ineffective in dampening the effects of housing market sentiments. Even so, PR1MA is only marginally 
effective in curtailing sentiments if LTV was at 70 percent. Likewise, LTV is only effective in curtailing 
sentiments at 70 and 80 percent. Even if we ignore the effects of sentiments, these measures themselves 
are ineffective in lowering house prices, judging from the lack of any statistical significance for the non-
interaction terms even though their coefficient signs are negative. Collectively, what Table 5 seems to 
suggest is, while the government and central bank measures may help lower house prices, it does little if 
anything at all to dampen housing market sentiments which on its own, has a stronger impact on house 
prices. 
Finally, having established that sentiment is the prominent driver of housing market returns in Malaysia, 
we now investigate the direct impact the cooling measures has on sentiment. Typically, whenever a cooling 
measure is introduced, house prices should fall. However, with the continued rise in prices, it seems that 
market players do not regard the cooling measures as a negative, long-term signal (Zhou, 2017). That is to 
say, if the cooling measures were effective, it should drive sentiments down. An additional test is performed 
to confirm this argument. The dependent variable here is the difference between the average sentiment 
after and before a new measure is introduced. In this test, we use a test horizon that ranges from 1 to 6 
months after and before the measure is introduced. The regression estimates are in Table 6 below. 
INSERT TABLE 6 HERE 
The estimates in Table 6 reaffirms the earlier results. The cooling measures introduced seem to have little 
effect on dampening sentiments except for PR1MA and LTV. Even so, their effectiveness only lasts up to 
3 months before losing significance, suggesting that optimism in the Malaysian housing market persists in 
spite of extant measures to cool the market; a phenomenon that can be attributed to a protracted housing 
boom in the country. As a result, the market expects the growth to continue into the future despite contrary 
measures (Agarwal, Hu, and Huang, 2015). We can also see that the festive and holiday periods in the 





4.4 Robustness Tests 
To ensure that our constructed sentiment index accurately reflects sentiments in the housing market of 
other states, an out-of-sample test is performed using data from the states not included in the earlier 
estimations15 by first calculating the monthly sentiment index for the out-of-sample states before estimating 
Equation 4 using data from these states. As the earlier results show that the strongest statistical significance 
was at b = 1 at an LTV of 70 percent, the estimation is performed using these parameters. Table 7 provides 
the regression estimates for every state in our dataset. 
INSERT TABLE 7 HERE 
The results of the out-of-sample test in Table 7 affirms the earlier findings that housing market sentiments 
drive Malaysian house prices. There also seems to be a clear difference in the magnitude of the relationship 
between the former (i.e. Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, and Penang) and latter (i.e. Kedah, Perak, Negeri 
Sembilan, and Malacca) states. From Table 7, we can also see that government and central bank measures 
have been mostly ineffective in dampening sentiments in each state. The exceptions in this case are the 
effects of PR1MA in Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, and Negeri Sembilan, as well as the effects of LTV in Kuala 
Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, Penang, and Negeri Sembilan. 
A possible concern of insufficient degrees of freedom arises from using monthly observations. To address 
this, Equation 5 is re-estimated using daily observations. After excluding weekends, we have 2,508 
observations, which should address this concern. The results are in Table 8 below. 
INSERT TABLE 8 HERE 
On the whole, the results in Table 8 are qualitatively similar with the earlier findings that housing market 
sentiment is a strong driver of housing market returns, and that the cooling measures introduced by the 
government and central bank have so far been ineffective in dampening sentiment. 
5.0 Discussion & Conclusion 
The results above lead to a few key observations. First, housing market optimism drives house prices in 
Malaysia. Pessimism meanwhile does not bring prices down. However, as opposed to the literature (Zhou, 
2017; Berger & Turtle, 2015; Stambaugh et al., 2012), periods of market optimism are followed by higher 
rather than lower housing market returns. This may be attributed to the recent trend of seeking rental 
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returns. Property classifieds in the country are flooded with listings citing substantial rental opportunities, 
largely driven by the advent of crowdsourced accommodation platforms such as Airbnb. Personal 
correspondence with real estate professionals reveal that a substantial number of recently-concluded deals 
were the result of optimism in future rental returns. The greater the potential rental return, the higher the 
price buyers were willing to pay for the house.  
Second, the cooling measures introduced by the Malaysian government and the central bank so far has not 
been able to dampen market sentiments. Even the introduction of government-subsidised affordable 
housing projects and a stricter loan-to-value policy only curbs market optimism for a short period. We have 
reason to believe that this because of an extended boom in the housing market, leading to a heightened 
sense of confidence among consumers, investors, and developers alike. As a result, house prices continue 
to rise in tandem with market optimism instead of fundamentals, irrespective of the cooling measures 
introduced by the government.  
The results also show a stark contrast in the effects of market optimism in different states. The effects of 
optimism are much stronger in the states of Kuala Lumpur, Selangor, Johor, and Penang, as compared to 
Kedah, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, and Malacca. House prices in the former four states are more strongly 
driven by housing market sentiments as compared to the latter since substantial development take place in 
the former. The latter in contrast, have a much wider dispersion of population and development. 
Additionally, agriculture has been the main economic activity in the latter states where infrastructural 
development progressed at a much slower pace. It is only in recent years that buyers consider Seremban – 
the capital city of the state of Negeri Sembilan – to be a satellite city to Kuala Lumpur, hence the stronger 
impact of sentiments in the state. 
The findings of this study have a number of policy implications. First, we provide evidence that NewStock 
has the strongest influence on housing market sentiments. This suggests that contrary to popular opinion, 
developers instead of individual sellers drive housing market sentiments in Malaysia. In fact, homeowners 
looking to sell have an incentive to set asking prices that match the prices of new developments in the area. 
When new projects are sold at high prices, there is an incentive for real estate negotiators to keep the seller’s 
asking price high. Driven by the optimism in the initial few transactions, more sellers will follow suit driving 
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sentiments and subsequently prices higher. Second, the populace of an emerging market like Malaysia 
remains unsophisticated in their investment choices. Many investors still prefer real estate as the ‘safer’ 
choice compared to financial securities. A lack of attractive investment alternatives in the financial markets 
also contribute to the demand for real estate investment.  
To address the first issue, local governments should limit the number of new projects approved. As of Q3 
2017, there are approximately 5.4 million residential units in stock with a further 480,000 units of incoming 
supply, and a further 427,692 units planned across the country. With an estimated population of 32 million 
(as of 2017), the number of persons per residential unit will be about 5 when all current projects are 
completed. Meanwhile, the average household size in Malaysia is 4.31 persons. These simple calculations 
suggest that the current stock of residential units is sufficient to house the country’s population. Measures 
should thus be taken to ensure that the growth of new housing projects approved should be in tandem with 
population requirements. Addressing the second issue is a matter of financial education, provision of 
investment incentives such as tax exemptions, and a reduction in the barriers to entry for new investors. 
While prudence is always advised, liberalization of the financial markets to allow a wider range of investment 
alternatives is also required. 
Our approach, however, is not without limitations. For instance, even though our dataset provided various 
information on each property and the transactions, we could not control for property type (e.g. 
condominium, flat, town house etc) as there were far too many categories to be considered. Our dataset 
had 13 distinct property types. Controlling for each of their effects would render the empirical findings 
unreliable due to overspecification. Another factor we could not account for was the age of the property 
since this was not included in the dataset provided by NAPIC. For future research, this paper makes a few 
recommendations. First, further investigation of housing market sentiments with respect to rental returns 
is required. The costs and restrictions in property purchases can be substantial. As a result, many young 
adults are looking to renting as opposed to owning as a means to independent living. How then does the 
prospect of future rental receipts factor into housing market sentiments, especially since there is no 
guarantee of occupancy given the growing supply of residential units? Second, although Bank Negara’s 
lending policies are considered one of the most prudent, it does not stop the non-performance of housing 
loans. To develop more holistic measures in addressing housing market sentiments, one can study the bank-
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specific factors that dampen or drive sentiments. Finally, one may also choose to study the influence of 
micro-factors (e.g. house characteristics, address, neighbourhood demographics) on housing market 
sentiments to assist in the development of policies that are more targeted.  
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Figure 1: Cumulative Change in the Sentiment Index, House Price Index, Consumer & Business 
Confidence Index, January 2010 – December 2019 
 
The observation period is from 2010:Q1 to 2019:Q4. Values of each index are averaged quarterly, before calculating and then 
cumulating the quarterly changes over time. The sentiment index values have been winsorized at the top and bottom 1% levels. 
Correlation coefficients of the sentiment index against the house price index, consumer confidence index, and business confidence 
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Table 1: Annual averages of the sentiment proxies, 2010 – 2019. 
Year NewStock ResMort HoldPer SubSale PSQM P1M 
2010 2.541 0.456 6.853 10.578 158.54 5.231 
2011 3.289 0.679 6.024 13.911 179.61 5.385 
2012 2.132 0.568 6.172 12.118 205.32 6.123 
2013 2.291 0.632 6.125 12.654 245.25 6.549 
2014 2.875 0.659 7.056 13.271 305.33 7.167 
2015 2.116 0.559 7.011 12.513 363.87 7.385 
2016 2.758 0.551 6.954 12.245 401.51 8.134 
2017 2.811 0.578 6.731 12.355 411.73 8.544 
2018 2.859 0.588 6.615 12.521 412.24 8.783 
2019 2.979 0.621 6.523 12.489 414.38 8.916 
NewStock is the incoming and completed supply of residential units scaled by the existing stock of residential units in the past 
quarter; ResMort is the total residential mortgage divided by total loans in the country; HoldPer is the natural log of the median 
holding period of sellers (in months) as a proxy for turnover; SubSale is number of sub-sales in a month; PSQM is the average 


























Table 2: Current and lagged sentiment proxy correlation with the first principal component, P1 
Current Correlation with P1 Obs.a 1-month Lag Correlation with P1 Obs. 
NewStock 0.837*** 119 NewStock 0.767** 119 
ResMort 0.791*** 119 ResMort 0.534*** 119 
HoldPer -0.551*** 119 HoldPer -0.432** 119 
SubSale 0.523*** 119 SubSale 0.485*** 119 
PSQM 0.664*** 119 PSQM 0.781*** 119 
P1M 0.049 119 P1M 0.121 119 
aAt n – 1 degrees of freedom 
NewStock is the incoming and completed supply of residential units scaled by the existing stock of residential units in the past 
quarter; ResMort is the total residential mortgage divided by total loans in the country; HoldPer is the natural log of the median 
holding period of sellers (in months) as a proxy for turnover; SubSale is number of sub-sales in a month; PSQM is the average 




























Table 3: Predicting future housing market returns with current housing market sentiments. 

































































































R2 0.2313 0.2253 0.2398 0.2401 0.2204 0.2353 0.2279 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 
Note: Model (1) is the basic model; Model (2) includes the control variables M2 and BLR; Model (3) includes all 
variables and controls for seasonal effects. The dependent variable for Models (1) – (3) is Rt+1. The dependent variable 
for Models (4) – (7) is Rt+1,t+3 ; Rt+1,t+6 ; Rt+1,t+9 ; and Rt+1,t+12  respectively. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance 
at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed and time dummies are included 























Table 4: The impact of optimistic and pessimistic sentiments on housing market returns. 



















































































R2 0.2408 0.2355 0.2316 0.2222 0.2358 
N 119 119 119 119 119 
The dependent variable for Models (1) – (5) is Rt+1,t+3 ; Rt+1,t+6 ; Rt+1,t+9 ; and Rt+1,t+12  respectively. ***, **, and * denotes 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. Fixed and time 























Table 5: Effectiveness of cooling measures in dampening house prices. 
 b = 1 b = 3 













































































































































































































R2 0.2371 0.2247 0.2241 0.2195 0.2343 0.2215 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in 













Table 6: Effectiveness of cooling measures in dampening housing market sentiment. 

















































































































R2 0.2327 0.2299 0.2462 0.2518 0.2333 0.2128 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 
The dependent variable is S[t+1, t+n] – S[t – n, t – 1], where n ranges from 1 to 6 months. LTV is at the 70 percent level. ***, 
**, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 























Table 7: Effectiveness of cooling measures in dampening housing market returns, by state. 
 Kuala 
Lumpur 




















































































































































































































































































R2 0.2553 0.2391 0.2384 0.2411 0.2138 0.2129 0.2165 0.2217 
N 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 119 














Table 8: Effectiveness of cooling measures in dampening housing market returns, by state, daily. 
 Kuala 
Lumpur 




















































































































































































































































































R2 0.2355 0.2283 0.2258 0.2350 0.2135 0.2338 0.2394 0.2373 
N 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 2,508 
The dependent variable is R[t + 1, t + b] , where b = 30. ***, **, and * denotes statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 














Table A1: Current and lagged sentiment proxy correlation with the first principal component, P1, 
using alternative proxies. 
Current Correlation with P1 Obs.a 1-month Lag Correlation with P1 Obs. 
VCWD 0.844*** 11 VCWD 0.727** 11 
ResMort 0.781*** 11 ResMort 0.563*** 11 
HoldPer -0.532*** 11 HoldPer -0.427** 11 
SubSale 0.541*** 11 SubSale 0.4915*** 11 
LPSQM 0.614*** 11 LPSQM 0.761*** 11 
aAt n – 1 degrees of freedom 
VCWD is the value of construction work done from January 2020 to December 2020; ResMort is the total residential mortgage 
divided by total loans in the country; HoldPer is the natural log of the median holding period of sellers (in months) as a proxy for 
turnover; SubSale is number of sub-sales in a month; LPSQM is the average list price per square meter in a month, sourced from 
property listing sites. We could not find in-sample data (2010 to 2019) for LPSQM as the listings had expired. Web-archived search 
results for these listings were inconsistent and unreliable. 
 
Table A2: Predicting future housing market returns with current housing market sentiments, using 
alternative proxies. 

































































































R2 0.2441 0.2325 0.2376 0.2422 0.2213 0.2418 0.2369 
N 118 118 118 118 118 118 118 
Note: Model (1) is the basic model; Model (2) includes the control variables M2 and BLR; Model (3) includes all 
variables and controls for seasonal effects. The dependent variable for Models (1) – (3) is Rt+1. The dependent 
variable for Models (4) – (7) is Rt+1,t+3 ; Rt+1,t+6 ; Rt+1,t+9 ; and Rt+1,t+12  respectively. ***, **, and * denotes statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively. Standard errors are in parentheses. 
 
Table A3: Correlation Matrix of Sentiment Proxies 
 NewStock ResMort HoldPer SubSale PSQM P1M 
NewStock 1      
ResMort 0.7875 1     
HoldPer 0.7323 0.6858 1    
SubSale 0.7532 0.6826 0.7726 1   
PSQM 0.7964 0.7136 0.7307 0.7101 1  
P1M 0.7270 0.6903 0.7324 0.7860 0.8144 1 
NewStock is the incoming and completed supply of residential units scaled by the existing stock of residential units in the past 
quarter; ResMort is the total residential mortgage divided by total loans in the country; HoldPer is the natural log of the median 
holding period of sellers (in months) as a proxy for turnover; SubSale is number of sub-sales in a month; PSQM is the average 
transacted price per square meter in a month; and P1M is the number of transactions worth RM1 million and above in a month. 
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1 The monthly data was sourced from the CEIC database, at the time of writing this manuscript (circa 2019). 
2 In Malaysia, a sub-sale is when a buyer buys a house from the developer (under a new project) only to sell it off in 
the secondary market. A sub-sale also includes a purchase from non-developer sellers. 
3 Housing developers in Malaysia are legally allowed to extend the completion date of a housing project up to 48 
months. The real property gains tax rate after the 48th month of ownership is 15%. This provides a significant incentive 
for sellers to hold-off a sub-sale until after that period. 
4 A transacted price of RM1 million in our dataset lies in the 90th percentile. In comparison, the average transacted 
price across all four states is approximately RM600,000. A premium of RM400,000 above the average price would 
suggest some degree of confidence in the housing market. 
5 A correlation matrix between the chosen sentiment proxies is presented in Table A3 of the Appendix. Estimated 
correlation coefficients are relatively high and statistically significant at the 1% level. Augmented Dickey-Fuller and 
Durbin-Watson tests do not show any evidence of unit root or serial correlation issues. We did not present the 
results here to avoid clutter and distracting from the main results. 
6 The anonymous reviewer was of the opinion that the proxy NewStock does not necessarily capture developer 
sentiment and suggested the number of newly approved development permits or construction starts as better gauge. 
We are inclined to agree but this data is only available from the 150 or so local municipal, city, or district council 
offices. With zero funding and only a small authoring team, obtaining this data within the stipulated time for 
revising the manuscript was not feasible. Instead, we substituted the NewStock proxy with “Value of Construction 
Work Done” obtained from the Department of Statistics, Malaysia. The rationale is simple. The more optimistic the 
developer sentiment, the more they are willing to spend on construction work as they are confident in recouping 
their costs in the future. Similarly, the anonymous reviewer was also of the opinion that PSQM and P1M does not 
accurately capture seller sentiments due to various confounding factors. As an alternative, we substituted these two 
proxies with the “Listed Price per Square Meter”, reason being the more optimistic the seller, the higher the price 
they expect to receive on the sale. The results of these alternative proxies are provided in Table A1 and A2 of the 
Appendix. They are fundamentally similar to the original estimates. We thank the reviewer for this suggestion. 
7 We assume that the sentiment proxies are related to the expected housing market returns and uncorrelated with 
unpredictable return shocks. 
8 The major festivals in Malaysia are Chinese New Year (January – February); Eid al-Fitr; Diwali (typically October – 
November); and Christmas. 
9 School holidays in Malaysia are typically in the months of March, May, September, and November to December. 
10 A casual Google search using the keywords “Chinese New Year; Property; Promo” or “Hari Raya; Property; 
Promo” (i.e., the two largest festivals / holiday periods in the country) will reveal plenty of these examples from an 
assortment of property developers. 
11 Variables where the source data was recorded on a quarterly basis was disaggregated using a simple fixed-weight 
dissection (Rogers et al., 1991). 
12 For brevity, these estimates are not presented here but are available upon request. 
13 We use the state’s monthly median household income to represent the income of all postcodes i that fall within its 
respective state’s borders. For example, the income for postcodes starting from 10000 to 13800 is represented by 
the state of Penang’s monthly median household income. 
14 The intuition behind this variable is simple. BNM’s policy to assess borrowers based on their net rather than gross 
income was to avoid over-leveraging and to dampen demand. Following the typical one-third rule, if one-third of their 
net income is lower than the monthly repayment of a house, it puts a purchase beyond their reach. This should thus 
dampen sentiment. 
15 The remaining states in our dataset are Kedah, Perak, Negeri Sembilan, and Melaka. 
                                                          
